I’ve been a faculty member at the Hebrew U – on a joint appointment in law and philosophy – since 2003.
I work primarily in moral, legal, and political philosophy.
In moral philosophy, much of my work has been in metaethics, where I defend a fairly robust objectivist, realist view about morality and about normativity more generally. According to this view, there are moral (and other normative) facts that do not constitutively depend on us, that we discover rather than create or construct, and that are irreducible to run-of-the-mill natural facts.
In the philosophy of law I sometimes voice skepticism about the more conceptual parts of the discussion about the nature of law, and I take part mostly in normative discussions about law, such as questions about the right status of statistical evidence, or about the role of luck in morality and law.
In political philosophy I develop and defend a comprehensive liberal view – one that does not aspire to the kind of neutrality Rawls’s “Political Liberalism” aspires to. I criticize such Rawlsian views, and I try to accommodate, within liberalism, insights more commonly found among critics of liberalism.
In the faculty of law I usually teach jurisprudence (usually, the part that is really just intro to moral and political philosophy), and sometimes a workshop or seminar at the intersection of law and philosophy. In the philosophy department I usually teach the first-year course “Central Problems in Philosophy”, and various seminars (mostly in metaethics and in political philosophy).
B.A. in Law and Philosophy, Tel Aviv University
PhD in philosophy, NYU
- Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism (Oxford University Press, 2011).
- "Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won't Come from What is Constitutive of Agency?, Philosophical Review 115 (2006), 169-198.
- "Reason-Giving and the Law", Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Law 1 (2011), 1-38.
- "Moral Luck and the Law", Philosophy Compass 5 (2010), 42-54.
- "Being Responsible, Taking Responsibility, and Penumbral Agency”, in Ulrike Heuer and Gerald Lang (eds.) Luck, Value and Commitment: Themes from the Ethics of Bernard Williams (Oxford University Press, 2012).
Dr. Ofer Malcai has been a faculty member in the Faculty of Law since 2016. His main fields of interest are evidence law, legal and moral philosophy, and the interface between law and complex systems. After receiving his first degree in Law from the Hebrew University, Ofer clerked for Justice Esther Hayut of the Israeli Supreme Court, and then pursued doctoral studies in Law at the Hebrew University, graduating in 2015. Ofer also holds a first degree in physics and mathematics, and M.Sc. and Ph.D. in physics, all from the Hebrew U.
B.Sc. (Physics and Mathematics), Hebrew University.
M.Sc. (Physics), magna cum laude, Hebrew University.
LL.B. (Law), magna cum laude, Hebrew University.
Ph.D. (Physics), Hebrew University.
LL.D. (Law), Hebrew University
Using Complexity to Calibrate Legal Response to Covid-19, 9 Front. Phys., 650943:1-13 (2021) (with Michal Shur-Ofry), https://doi.org/10.3389/fphy.2021.650943
Institutions for Collective Action and Social Contagion —Community Gardens as a Case Study, 15(1) Regulation & Governance 63-81 (2021) (with Michal Shur-Ofry), http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/rego.12256
Reasonable Self-doubt.15(1) Criminal Law and Philosophy 25-45 (2021) (with Ram Rivlin), https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-020-09528-7
Which Came First, the Procedure or the Substance? Justificational Priority and the Substance–Procedure Distinction, 34(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1-19 (2014) (with Ronit Levine-Schnur), http://doi:10.1093/ojls/gqt032
LL.B., Summa cum Laude, The Hebrew University
LL.M., Magna cum Laude, The Hebrew University
Ph.D., The Hebrew University
General Versus Special Theories of Discrimination, Journal of Moral Philosophy (2021).
Continuity in Morality and Law, Theoretical Inquiries in Law (2021).
Moral Innocence and the Criminal Law: Non-Mala Actions and Non-Culpable Agents, Cambridge Law Journal 79 (2020).
Should Law Track Morality? Criminal Justice Ethics 36 (2017): 205-223.
Responsibility and Justificatory Defenses, Criminal Law & Philosophy 11 (2017): 97-110.
Should We Prevent Deontological Wrongdoing? Philosophical Studies 173 (2016): 2049-2068.
Moral Rightness and the Significance of Law: Why, How and When Mistake of Law Matters, University of Toronto Law Journal 64 (2014): 36-63.
Justification under Uncertainty, Law & Philosophy 31 (2012): 523-563.
Hierarchical Consequentialism, Utilitas 22 (2010): 309-330.
Second-Order Equality and Levelling Down, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2009): 425-443.
Well-Being and Fairness, Philosophical Studies 131 (2006): 369-391.