

List of Publications, roughly divided by topic

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Metaethics

- [Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism](#) (Oxford University Press, 2011).
- "Constitutivism: On Rabbits, Hats, and Holy Grails", forthcoming in a Routledge volume on practical reason, edited by Ruth Chang and Kurt Sylvan.
- "How Principles Ground", forthcoming in *Oxford Studies in Metaethics*.
- "[Impartiality and Realism: Reply to Mancuso](#)", *Topoi* (2017).
- "Non-Naturalistic Realism", in McPherson and Plunkett (eds.) [Routledge Handbook of Metaethics](#) (2017), 29-42
- "[What Do You Mean 'This Isn't the Question?'](#)", co-authored with Tristram McPherson, *The Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 47 (2017), 820-840.
- "Indispensability Arguments in Metaethics: Even Better than in Mathematics?", in [Explanation in Ethics and in Mathematics](#) (Edited by Neil Sinclair and Uri Leibowitz) (Oxford University Press 2016), 236-254.
- "[A Defense of Moral Deference](#)", *The Journal of Philosophy* 111 (2014), 1-30.
- "[Precis of Taking Morality Seriously](#)", and "[In Defense of Taking Morality Seriously](#)", *Philosophical Studies* 168 (2014):819–821; 853-865 (a symposium on my book).
- "Why I'm an Objectivist about Ethics (and Why You Are Too)", Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.) [The Ethical Life](#) (OUP, 3rd ed., 2014).
- "[On Analogies, Disanalogies, and Moral Philosophy: A Comment on John Mikhail's Elements of Moral Cognition](#)", *The Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies* 8 (2013), 1-25.
- "[On Mark Schroeder's Hypotheticalism](#)", *The Philosophical Review* 120 (2011), 423-446.
- "[Giving Practical Reasons](#)", *The Philosopher's Imprint* 11(4) (2011).
- "Shmagency Revisited", [New Waves in Metaethics](#) (Michael Brady ed.) (2010), 208-233.
- "How Objectivity Matters", in Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.) [Oxford Studies in Metaethics](#) 5 (2010), 111-152.
- "[Can there be a Global, Interesting, Coherent Constructivism about Practical Reason?](#)", *Philosophical Explorations* 12(3) (2009), 319-339.
- "[The Epistemological Challenge to Metanormative Realism: How Best to Understand It, and How to Cope with It](#)", *Philosophical Studies* 148 (2010), 413-438.
- "[How Is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Realism?](#)", *The Journal of Ethics* 13(1) (2009), 15.
- "An Outline of an Argument for Robust Metanormative Realism", [Oxford Studies in Metaethics](#) 2 (2007), pp. 21-50.
- "[Rationality, Coherence, Convergence: A Critical Comment on Michael Smith's Ethics and the A Priori](#)", *Philosophical Books* 48 (2007), 99-108.
- "[Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won't Come from What is Constitutive of Agency](#)", *Philosophical Review* 115 (2006), 169-198.
- "[Why Idealize?](#)", *Ethics* 115(4) (2005), 759-787.

David Enoch

- [“How Noncognitivists Can Avoid Wishful Thinking”](#), *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* 41 (4) (Winter, 2003), 527-545.
- [“Noncognitivism, Normativity and Belief: A Reply to Jackson”](#), *Ratio* XIV(2) (2001), 185-190.

Normative Ethics and Political Philosophy

- [“Hypothetical Consent and the Value\(s\) of Autonomy”](#), *Ethics* 128 (2017), 6-36.
- [“The Masses and the Elites: political philosophy for the age of Brexit, Trump and Netanyahu”](#), *Jurisprudence* 8 (2017), 1-22. (A version of which was published in Hebrew, in *Alpayim Ve’od*).
- [“Political Philosophy and Epistemology: The Case of Public Reason”](#), *Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy* 3 (2017), 132-165.
- [“What’s Wrong with Paternalism? Autonomy, Belief, and Action”](#), *The Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 116 (2016), 21-48.
- [“Against Public Reason”](#), *Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy* 1 (2015), 112-142.
- [“The Disorder of Public Reason: A Critical Study of Gerald Gaus's The Order of Public Reason”](#), *Ethics* 124: 141-176 (2013).
- [“Moral Luck”](#), *The International Encyclopedia of Ethics* (2013).
- [“Authority and Reason-Giving”](#), *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 89 (2014), 296-332.
- [“Being Responsible, Taking Responsibility, and Penumbra Agency”](#), in Ulrike Heuer and Gerald Lang (eds.) *Luck, Value and Commitment: Themes from the Ethics of Bernard Williams* (Oxford University Press, 2012).
- [“Wouldn't It Be Nice If p, therefore p”](#), *Utilitas* 21 (2009), 222-4.
- [“Cognitive Biases and Moral Luck”](#), co-authored with Ehud Guttel, *The Journal of Moral Philosophy* 7 (2010), 372-386.
- [“On Estlund's Democratic Authority”](#), *Iyyun* 58 (2009), 35-48
- [“Deontology, Individualism, and Uncertainty: A Reply to Jackson and Smith”](#), co-authored with Ron Aboudi and Adi Borer, *The Journal of Philosophy* 105(5) (2008).
- [“The Case against Moral Luck”](#), co-authored with Andrei Marmor, *Law and Philosophy* 26 (4) (2006), 405-436.
- [“Intending, Foreseeing, and the State”](#), *Legal Theory* 13 (2007), 69-99.
- [“What’s the Difference between Terrorist Acts and Targeted Killings? A Thought on the Distinction between Intending and Foreseeing Harm to Innocents”](#), in *Unintentionally: Harming Civilians as a Part of the War on Terror* (The Israel Democracy Institute, 2007) (in Hebrew).
- [“Taking Disagreement Seriously: Some Critical Comments on Jeremy Waldron’s Law and Disagreement”](#), *The Israel Law Review* 39 (2007), 22-35.
- [“Whose Right Is It? Reflections on Harel’s Reflections on Palestinians’ Interests in Return”](#), *5 Theoretical Inquiries in Law* (2004), 367-377.

Philosophy of Law

- [“Is General Jurisprudence Interesting?”](#) forthcoming in *Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence* (edited by David Plunkett, Scott Shapiro, and Kevin Toh) (from Oxford University Press).
- [“In Praise of Modest Instrumentalism: Critical Comments on Alon Harel’s Why Law Matters”](#), (in Hebrew), *Iyunei Mishpat* 2015, 181-192.

David Enoch

- David Enoch and Talia Fisher, "[Sense and Sensitivity: Epistemic and Instrumental Approaches to Statistical Evidence](#)", *The Stanford Law Review* 67 (2015), 557-611
- "[Tort Liability and Taking Responsibility](#)", in John Oberdeek (ed.) *Philosophical Foundations of the Law of Torts* (Oxford University Press, 2014), 250-271.
- David Enoch and Kevin Toh, "[Legal as a Thick Concept](#)", in Will Waluchow and Steffan Sciarafa (eds.) *Philosophical Foundations of the Nature of Law* (Oxford University Press, 2013), 257-278.
- "[A Comment on Yaffe's Attempts](#)", *The Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies* 6 (2012), 20-35.
- "[Statistical Evidence, Sensitivity, and the Legal Value of Knowledge](#)" (co-authored with Levi Spectre and Talia Fisher), *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 40 (2012), 197-224.
- "[Reason-Giving and the Law](#)", *Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Law* 1 (2011), 1-38.
- "[Moral Luck and the Law](#)", *Philosophy Compass* 5 (2010), 42-54.
- "[More on the Conscience-Based Exemption from Military Service: A Reply to Dani Statman](#)", 31 *Iyunei Mishpat* (the Tel Aviv University Law Review) (2009), 709-740 (in Hebrew).
- "[Philosophical Discussion of and in the Law](#)", co-authored with Alon Harel, *Din Udvarim* 4 (2008), 17-54 (in Hebrew).
- "[Luck between Morality, Law and Justice](#)", *Theoretical Inquiries in Law* 9 (2008), 23-59.
- "[Ends, Means, Side-Effects, and Beyond: A Comment on the Justification of the Use of Force](#)", *Theoretical Inquiries in Law* 7(1) (2006), 43-57.
- "[On the Military Court's Decision in the Matter of the Five Objectors](#)", 8(2) *Mishpat Umimshal* (2005), 701-730. (In Hebrew).
- "[Some Arguments against Conscientious Objection and Civil Disobedience Refuted](#)", 36 *Israel Law Review* (2002) (published in 2004), 227-253.
- "[A Right to Violate One's Duty](#)", *Law and Philosophy* 21 (2002), 355-384. (A revised version of this paper translated to Italian appeared in *Ragion Pratica* 24 (guigno 2005), 17-37.)

Other

- "[Not Just a Truthometer: Taking Oneself Seriously \(But Not Too Seriously\) in Cases of Peer Disagreement](#)", *Mind*, 119 (2011), 953-997.
- "[How Are Basic Belief-Forming Methods Justified?](#)", co-authored with Joshua Schechter, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 76 (3) (2008), 547-579.
- "[Epistemicism and Nihilism about Vagueness: What's the Difference?](#)", *Philosophical Studies* 133(2) (2007), 285-311.
- "[Meaning and Justification: The Case of Modus Ponens](#)" (co-authored with Joshua Schechter), *Noûs* 40(4) (2006), 687-715.
- "[Once You Start Using Slippery Slope Arguments, You're on a Very Slippery Slope](#)", *Oxford Journal of Legal Studies*, 21(4) (2001), 629-647.